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De-Regulation as the New Regulation: Telecom's
Philosophy Turnabout and the Story Of a ForwardLooking Formula That Brought Back Competition

By Christia Crocker*

I. INTRODUCTION
While the United States takes pride in its exemplary capitalistic
success, there are many industries which, because of their nature,
high public demand, widespread use, and need for uniformity,
develop into natural monopolies.'
Since the era of the railroad,
Congress has vested authority in agencies to manage the specific
challenges of monopolistic industries. 2 The history of telephone
service is a classic example.
On May 13, 2002, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Congress's
delegation of power over local telephone carriers to the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) in Verizon Communications,
Inc. v. F.C.C.3 The Court made holdings concerning the FCC's
ratemaking methodology and interpretations regarding the practical
implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996

* J.D. Candidate, December, 2003. The author would like to thank Michael
Karp for his love and support, and the Crocker family and friends for their patient
kindness. Gratitude also goes to Dean Richard Cupp for his insight and inspiration.
1. Reed Hundt, Antitrust and Interconnection: Old Wine in New Bottles
(Telecommunications Act of 1996), Remarks at the Antitrust Conference for
Corporate General Counsels (Oct. 22, 1996) at 1, availableat 1996 WL 646783.

2. Id.
3. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 496-527 (2002).
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Act"). 4 These decisions answered overarching issues in each of the
five separate cases which were joined together for the court's
consideration. 5 First, reaffirming the FCC's authority to require state
utility commissions to the set rates incumbent phone carries charge
competing phone carriers for the lease of network elements, the
Court found that these rates can be forward-looking, as opposed to
being based on the incumbent carriers' past historical rate trends or
investments. 6 The Court also found the FCC's method of setting
rates for the lease of the network elements to competing carriers to be
reasonable and consistent with the 1996 Act. 7 Finally, the Court
asserted that under the 1996 Act, the FCC may require the incumbent
phone carries to combine network elements for the competing phone
carriers if the competing phone carriers
request combination, and are
8
assistance.
without
unable to combine
The Verizon opinion had the practical implication of clearing the
air and giving a clean interpretation of the 1996 Act for the many
jurisdictions that were struggling with similar issues nationwide, but
the decision also struck a curious balance: de-regulating through an
industry's regulatory agency. 9 Somehow, the FCC has come out of
the Telecommunications Act crucible with more power than ever
provided that the agency accepts their new role as guardian of
competition, not competitors. 10

4. Id. at 498-524.
5. Id. at 473.
6. Id. at 496-526.
7. Id. at 496-524.

8. Id.
9. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Past and Future
Economic and Political Consequences of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1394 (1999) (citing Alfred Kahn, LETTING Go:
DEGREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION OR KLEPTOCRATS AND THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY DISINGENUOUSNESS (1998)).

10. FCC Commissioner Gloria Tristani, The Enforcement Model: Breaking
Through Barriers On The Road to Competition, PLI Annual Institute on
Telecommunications,
Dec.
14,
2000,
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Tristani/2000/spgt01 3.html.
Section 271 also provides for some specific enforcement processes. Once
an application has been approved, the FCC has explicit authority to take
enforcement action if a Bell company ceases to meet a condition of its
approval. If this occurs, we can order the carrier to come into compliance
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This note will begin in Part II, with a summary of the historical
development of ratemaking and regulation in the telecommunications
industry through the judiciary. Part III is a critique of the Verizon
case, which includes: (a) the facts of the case; (b) an analysis of the
majority opinion; and (c) a statement of the concurring opinions with
an analysis of the dissent. Part IV discusses the impact of the case on
the legal landscape and our society at large, and Part V will conclude
with an illustration of Verizon's impact.
II. HISTORY

A. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
The history of federal ratemaking through congressionally
appointed regulatory agencies began most significantly with the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (1887 Act).' The 1887 Act was
born with the rise of industry in America, and while it primarily
governed rates of the railroads, it was the basis for all interstate
regulations. 12 As certain commodities, e.g., railroad shipping and
transportation, electricity, power, airlines, and telecommunications,
became available and almost instantaneously vital to our day-to-day
lives, "natural monopolies" sprang up.' 3 The first providers to
market became the only players in town. 14 Rather than sacrifice the
usefulness of the industries that were making the day-to-day lives of
Americans more convenient and comfortable by shutting the

with the terms of their 271 approval, we can fine them, we can suspend
their ability to provide long distance service and, in egregious cases, we
can revoke the long distance authority. Id.
11. Verizon, 535 U.S. 478 n.3 (The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 "was the
model for subsequent federal public-utility statutes like.. . the Mann-Elkins Act of
1910, 36 Stat. 539 [which] was the earliest federal statute prescribing rates for
interstate an foreign telephone and telegraph carriers, as part of revisions to railroad
rates set by the Interstate Commerce Commission." See R. Vietor, CONTRIVED
COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 171 (1994)).

12. Id.
13. Reed Hundt, supra note 1.
14. Gregory Ogden, Federal and State Administrative Law class lecture (Aug.
20, 2002).
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monopolies down completely, Congress began to regulate these
businesses. 15 This had the practical effect of leaving the monopoly
intact, but under the watchdog of an agency that would impose rules
6
that allowed the utility to be used in the best interest of the people.'
B. FairValue Method
Enabling Acts for these agencies would generally mandate that
rates for the utilities or commodities were "just and reasonable."
However, specific guidelines were needed to truly keep
discrimination at bay, and as a result, a rate determination scheme
known as the "fair value method" was introduced. 17 In Smyth v.
Ames, the Court determined that the calculation of the rate base must
be the "fair value of the property being used by [the utility] for the
convenience of the public."' 18 Several factors were to be considered
in the determination of "fair value" including: cost, expenditures on
improvements, market value, probable earning capacity, and
operating expenses.19
C. Twentieth Century Struggles
In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., the Court
required telegraph companies "to serve all customers in a
nondiscriminatory manner as a common carrier." 20 Furthermore,
between 1894 and 1906, thirty-four states mandated interconnection
obligations in an effort to "resolve disputes that had arisen between
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 478, 481 & n.4 (citing Barnes, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
37-41 (1942)). The rationale behind this method was to

UTILITY REGULATION

guard the public from any misfortunes the telephone company may encounter after
the public had come to rely on the service.
18. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 470-76, 545, 546 (1898). "If a corporation
cannot maintain such a highway and earn dividends for stockholders, it is a
misfortune for it and them which the Constitution does not require to be remedied
by imposing unjust burdens upon the public." Id.
19. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 481 (quoting Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546-47).
20. Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones,

GO-OOCM PRACTICING LAW INST. 630, 654 (2000) (citing Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 99-104 (1901)).

Spring 2003

De.Regulation as the New Regulation

the Bell System, the largest telephone company at the time, and
smaller independent telephone companies., 21 The next logical step
came in 1910, when the Mann-Elkins Act brought interstate
22
telephone regulation under the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Then, in 1913 under the "Kingsbury Commitment" AT&T agreed to
for long
interconnect with independent local telephone companies
23
distance calls in response to a threatened antitrust case.
D. Prudent-InvestmentRule
Rate determination continued to morph when the "prudentinvestment rule" was introduced in the early 1920s. Under this rule,
"'cost' came to mean 'cost of service,' [specifically,] the cost of
prudently invested capital used to provide the service. This was
calculated subject to deductions for accrued depreciation and
allowances for working capital.... ,24
E. CommunicationsAct of 1934
Finally in 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act of
1934 (1934 Act), "for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio...." 25 This Act
enabled the creation of the Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) and its enforcement of "the public interest, convenience, and
necessity. 26 In section 214(a) of the 1934 Act, Congress bestowed
upon the FCC the power to regulate entry into the interstate
telecommunications industry.2 7

21. Id.
22. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
23. Michael Kende, supra note 20, at 655 (citing Vogelsang and Mitchell,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION, at

64).

24. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 485 (citing P. Garfield & W. Lovejoy, PUBLIC
UTILITY ECONOMICS 56 (1964). See also Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 304-06 (1923).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
26.47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (2000).
27. Joseph D. Kearney, Note, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC?, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (2000).
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Section 214 (a) prohibits hopeful competitors "from entering the
interstate market 'unless and until there shall first have been obtained
from the Commission a certificate that the present and future public
28
convenience and necessity require or will require [such entry].,
The 1934 Act facilitated the regime of regulated natural monopolies,
where "retail and input rates and investments were directly regulated
by government, and jurisdiction was split between states and the
federal government." 29 States regulated telephone services within the
state, and the FCC regulated telephone services between the states.
This distinction, while perhaps seemingly logical at first, in a nation
that gives much deference to each State's power and autonomy,
became very costly, and led to inefficiencies in adapting new
technologies and pricing structures. 30
The results prohibited
competition on one hand, while "provid[ing] incentives for arbitrage
and opportunistic entry that would not occur in a competitive market
on the other." 31 Some states were so adamant about maintaining this
rate structure and control that many passed laws prohibiting
32
competing telephone companies altogether.
F. Actual Legitimate Cost
During this time, rate determination was shaped again. The courts
set limits for the deductions allowed under the "prudent-investment
rule" through their holdings that "actual legitimate cost" was
required. 33 "Actual legitimate cost" was simply a refusal to make
allowances for amortization apart from the overall operating cost,
because amortization was already figured into costs, therefore,
34
disallowing a "double benefit" to utility owners.

28. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. §214(a)).
29. Reed Hundt, supra note 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 596-98 (1944); Federal
Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1942);
Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 167-169 (1934).
34. Natural Gas, 315 U.S. 575, 593 (1942).
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G. The Bell Breakup
In the 1970s, MCI and other common carrier competitors
obtained approval from the FCC to provide private-line services, and
the D.C. Circuit in its "'Execunet' ruling held that the FCC, having
permitted MCI into one part of the interstate telecommunications
business, could not artificially cordon it off from other parts unless
the agency was willing explicitly to conclude that an AT&T
monopoly in long-distance telecommunications was required by the
35
public interest."
From the late 1970s into the early 1980s, MCI and other
competitors proved that the Bell System was not a necessary
monopoly. 36 The Department of Justice brought suit against the Bell
System in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., and the Court
ordered the breakup of the Bell System into AT&T, a long distance
service and equipment company, and the seven Regional Bell
37
Operating Companies which provided local telephone services.
This ruling, however, did not increase competition in the
The Constitution does not require that the owner who embarks in a
wasting-asset business of limited life shall receive at the end more than he
has put into it. We need not now consider whether, as the Government
urges, there can in no circumstances be a constitutional [sic] requirement
that the amortization base be the reproduction value rather than the actual
cost of the property devoted to a regulated business. Cf United Railways

v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1930).
'We refuse to make an allowance of amortization in excess of costs. To do
so would not be the computation of a proper expense, but instead the
allowance of additional profit over and above a fair return. Manifestly
such an additional return would unjustly penalize consumers.'

Id.
35. Joseph D. Kearney, supra note 27, at 1171 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). See, e.g., Peter Huber et al.,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW §§ 9.3.5-9.4.2, at 748-56 (1999); Glen 0.
Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 524 (1988).
36. Michael Kende, supra note 20, at 654.
37. Id. (citing United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982)); Verizon, 535 U.S. at 475-76. See also Vogelsang and Mitchell,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION, at 67-69; Brock, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE, Chpt. 9.
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"persistently monopolistic local markets, which were thought
to be
the root of natural monopoly in the telecommunications industry. 38
H. Price Caps
"[T]he final stage in a century of developing ratesetting
methodology" at the federal level, was the advent of price caps. 39
Price caps came along because the prudent-investment rule was
losing its teeth due to the telephone carriers' manipulation of the
amounts invested, depreciation and allowances, all factors that
determined the rate base.40 The price cap scheme works as follows:
The price-cap scheme starts with a rate generated by
the conventional cost-of-service formula, which it
takes as a benchmark to be decreased at an average of
some 2-3 percent a year to reflect productivity growth,
subject to an upward adjustment if necessary to reflect
inflation or certain unavoidable "exogenous costs" on
41
which the company is authorized to recover a return.
Even though the telephone carriers can still try to massage the
numbers regarding productivity offset and which costs are allowable,
companies have an incentive to maximize their productivity, because
they will be allowed to keep all profits above the productivity
offset.42

L Telecommunications Act of 1996

38. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 475.

39. Id. at 486-87
40. Id. at 487 (See also, In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd 6786, 6787, 1 (1990); United States Tel. Assn., v. FCC, 188
F.3d 521, 524 (C.A.D.C. 1999)).
41. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Kahn, Tariff & Weisman,
Telecommunications Act At Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of Its
Implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 INFO. ECON. &

POL'Y 319, 330-32 (1999); 5 FCC Rcd, at 6787, 5).
42. Id. (citing United States Tel. Assn., 188 F.3d at 524; 5 FCC Rcd, at 678788,
7-9).
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When the 1996 Act was passed, it turned the traditional telecom
philosophy on its head. 43 A self-proclaimed "Act to promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications customers
and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies," it demanded that the past protection of natural
monopolies be abandoned.44
1. FCC's First Report and Order
With any sweeping change comes a long winter of interpretation
and challenge, and the 1996 Act has not changed. The FCC's first
reaction to the 1996 Act was to issue its First Report and Order,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, [hereinafter First Report and
Order] on August 8, 1996. 45 The First Report and Order contained
comments and rules regarding the local competition provisions of the
1996 Act.

46

2. Stay of the First Report and Order
Immediately after its release, the First Report and Order was
criticized on two counts: (1) pricing provisions in Part 51 (F); and (2)
the incumbent responsibilities to the new competitors in Part 51 (I)
section 252(i) (referred to by incumbents as the "pick and choose"
rule).47 Challenges were made by four states and certain incumbent
telephone Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) in Iowa Utilities Board v.
F. C.C., when they sought and obtained a stay of the interconnection
order, pending judicial review of the Commission report and order
promulgating rules.48

43. Reed Hundt, supra note 1.
44. 47 U.S.C. Title Page to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (2000).

45. 11 FCC Rcd 1, 15499 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 421 (8th Cir. 1996); 11 FCC Rcd 1,
15499, 16217-23, 16235 (1996).
48. Id.
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a) Criticism of the Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC)
The first pricing complaints chiefly surrounded § 51.505(b),
which mandates that state commissions must use the:
TELRIC method to calculate the costs that an
incumbent LEC incurs in making its facilities
available to competitors.... [A]fter applying the
TELRIC method and arriving at a cost figure, the state
commission, acting as arbitrators, must then determine
the price that an incumbent LEC may charge its
49
competitors, based on TELRIC driven cost figure.
LECs had two main complaints about the TELRIC method:
Section 51.505(d)(1) did not allow the incumbents to consider past
("historical" or "embedded") costs they may have incurred, and
section 51.505(b)(1) required LECs to measure their cost "as if the
incumbent were using the most efficient telecommunications
technology currently available, regardless of the technology presently
employed by the incumbent and to be used by the competitor., 50 The
LECs feared that their costs would be underestimated and that prices
would be too low, "effectively requir[ing] them to subsidize their
competitors and thereby threaten the viability of [their] own
businesses.,51
b) Criticism of "Pick and Choose" Rule
LECs complaints regarding Part 51(I), are primarily based on the
fact that the FCC added the language "rates" to § 252(i) of the 1996
Act. 52 Under § 252(i), LECs are merely required to offer the same
"terms and conditions" (not rates) to competing carriers that the
LECs (themselves) have for interconnection services or network

49. Id. at 422 (citing 11 FCC Rcd 1, § 51.505(b)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 423.
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elements. 3 The LECs object that by including "rates" among the
competing carriers list of things to "shop for," the FCC has
effectively allowed entering competitors the ability to "'pick and
choose' the lowest-priced individual elements and services they need
from among all of the prior approved agreements between that LEC
and other carriers." 54 At its worst, the result would be non-binding
contracts and instability.55
3. Eighth Circuit Cases that Led to the First Supreme Court
Evaluation
In 1997, the following cases became the basis for the Supreme
Court's first writ of certiorari, and review.
a) Iowa Utilities Bd. v. F.C.C.
In Iowa Utilities Bd. v. F. C.C, the Eighth Circuit's Judge Hansen
made four rulings: (1) The FCC was outside of its authority when it
issued rules regarding rates; (2) the FCC's "pick and choose" rule
was unreasonable; (3) incumbent telephone service carriers didn't
have to provide higher quality service that what they gave
for
themselves; and (4) the incumbent carriers were not 5responsible
6
recombining elements that were requested as separate.
b) People of the State of Cal. v. F.C.C.
In People of the State of Cal. v. F.C.C., petitioners challenged
FCC rules for intra state telecom communications. Judge Hansen,
held in this case, to the extent that FCC's dialing parity rules
pertained to intralocal access and transport57areas, that such rules
exceeded the scope of the FCC's jurisdiction.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
57. People v. F.C.C., 124 F.3d 934, 939-43 (8th Cir. 1997). Judge Hansen
primarily based this decision on the fact that no Congressional authority was
expressly granted, and the 1934 Act requires such a grant for local rules to come
under the FCC's rule. Id.
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4. First Supreme Court Evaluation in: AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities
Bd.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd. reversed the Eighth Circuit's
determinations that the FCC had no authority to control state
commissioners' ratesetting methodology, and that the FCC
misconstrued the language of the 1996 Act. 58 The Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to impose a new ratesetting
methodology, and the Court reinstated the "principal combination
rule," 315(b), which forbids existing telephone carriers from
separating currently combined network elements before leasing them
to competitors. 59 However, the Court found that FCC Rule 319 was
not consistent with the 1996 Act because 319 did not require access
to the network elements to be necessary, nor did it require the
entering carrier to show it would be "impaired;" both are required
under § 251(d)(2) of the 1996 Act. 60 The Court then remanded the
61
cases "for proceedings consistent with [their] opinion."
5. Remand from the Supreme Court to the Eighth Circuit in: Iowa
UtilitiesBd. v. F. C.C.
On remand, the Court of Appeals invalidated not only the
TELRIC method, but several of the FCC rules regarding
interconnection and unbundled network elements. 62 The Eighth
Circuit held that § 252(d)(1) of the 1996 Act barred the used of
TELRIC methodology because the Act required rates to be based on
actual, not hypothetical costs of providing network elements. 63 The

58. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 375-97 (1999).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 398-99 (citing § 251 (d)(2) of the 1996 Act).
61. Id. at 397.
62. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 219 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2000). Specifically
regarding TELRIC, four challenges were made by the petitioners: 1) that the
network standard is hypothetical, 2) employs a forward-looking methodology, 3)
incumbent carriers will be unfairly burdened by universal service under the
"universal services subsidies" and 4) the pricing constitutes a "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 749-53.
63. Id. at 750.

Sparing 2003
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court also interpreted the "combining requests" that came in from
new competitors to the incumbent telephone carriers to mean that the
competing carriers had to do the combining as opposed to the
incumbents. 64 These two issues then became part of the larger
framework for the Supreme Court's analysis and determination in
their second review of the 1996 Act, Verizon Communications,Inc. v.
65
F.C.C.
6. Final Supreme Court Evaluation in: Verizon Communications,Inc.
v. F.C.C.
Now that a cursory foundation of the timeline and events that
brought the Verizon case to the Supreme Court has been given, the
critique is discussed below.

III. CRITIQUE
A. Facts of the Case
After the Supreme Court's initial ruling in AT&T Corp. and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' remand, the petitioners once again
sought and were granted review, along with four other cases the
Court decided to join together in its review of the FCC's rules
prompted by the 1996 Act. 66 The Court's holdings and analysis are
discussed the sections below.
B. Analysis of the Majority Holding
The majority held that "[T]he FCC is authorized: (1) to require
state utility commissions to set the rates charged by the incumbents
for leased elements on a forward-looking basis, untied to incumbents'
investment; and (2) to require incumbents to combine such elements
at the entrants' request when they lease them to the entrants.,,67

64. Id. at 757-59.
65. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 498-540.
66. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 219 F.3d 744 (2001); Verizon
535 U.S. at 467. The four other petitioners were: WorldCom, Inc., F.C.C., AT&T,

and General Communications.
67. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 475.
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1. FCC's Forward-Looking Rate-Setting Requirement is Upheld by
the Supreme Court
There were four reasons that the Court upheld the forwardlooking rate formula that the FCC mandated for state commissions
(in the instance that incumbents and new entrants cannot work out a
"just and reasonable" contract for lease of services). 68 The first three
reasons support the Court's broad objectives in adhering to
Congress's intent through the 1996 Act. 69 The fourth and last reason,
addresses the Court's approval of the FCC's methodology behind the
formula and delves heavily into the various rationales for dismissing
incumbent complaints.7 °
a)

The Court Upholds the FCC's Forward-Looking Formula
Because Congress Gave the FCC the Power to Prescribe
Methods for Ratesetting

To begin, Congress specifically directed the FCC to prescribe
methods for state commissions to use in setting rates in the 1996
Act.7 1 Congress's intent was to "reorganize markets by rendering
regulated utilities' monopolies vulnerable to interlopers . . . [t]he
approach was deliberate ... setting a basic, default methodology for

use in setting rates when carriers fail to agree, but leaving it to state
utility commissions to set the actual rates."72
It is a striking fact that none of the numerous lawsuits which
resulted in this case attacked the Constitutionality of the 1996 Act
itself. The incumbents seem to know that their stance is inherently
pitted against the anti-trust sentiments of the Constitution and the
nation's vote against skyrocketing prices and market manipulation
which allowed the passage of the 1996 Act. The incumbents seem to
be searching for a second-best theory to support the rationale behind
their historical hold on power in the local telecom market. Their

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 487-90.
Id. at 477-80, 488-89.
Id. at 496-527.
Id. at 489.

Id.
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claims come disguised in the sheep's cloth of State's rights while the
impact of their resistance exposes their national stronghold over
telecom power.
b) The Court Upholds the FCC's Forward-Looking Formula to
Offset Monopoly Power
Accordingly, the second reason the Court upheld the rate formula
was to offset incumbent monopoly power. 73
Because local
exchanges are networks that connect all telephones, faxes and
modems within a geographical area to one another through what
amounts to a "'central office,"' (trunks) the Court balked at the
"almost insurmountable competitive advantage" that incumbents
have in controlling the routing as well as the market, stating that "[a]
newcomer could not compete [in this market] . . . without coming

close to replicating

the incumbents'

entire existing network

[including] ...laying down the 'last mile' of feeder wire ...

to the

thousands (or millions) of terminal points in individual houses and
businesses.
A market so described, certainly falls outside of the
perimeters of the 1996 Act's call to equal opportunity in the market
75
and non-discriminatory competition.
But in the vivid details of the Court's rationale, it is difficult not
to consider the many hours, days, months, and years that people spent
in the rain, snow and sun (even underwater) to build the existing
systems. Those people were paid by companies that took great
economic risk during Telecom's first bloom, and expanded the
network to keep up with the rapidly increasing pace of the average
American's life. Indeed, there is something paradoxical about the
Court raising the "good old-fashioned competition" argument when
all of the heavy-lifting has been done.
On the other hand, it is easy to understand the FCC and the
entrants' argument of "unfair advantage." Many of today's entrants
were yesterday's frustrated competitors who might have been able to
build equally successful markets and lay just as much "line," if the
regulations of the past had fostered competition instead of keeping

73. Id. at 490.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 487-89.
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local monopolies in place. The Court seems to be upholding the
equivalent of "affirmative action" for "minority" phone service
carriers. While these decisions may have been made under the broad
strokes of "competition, good-monopoly, bad," the people have
spoken through Congress's 1996 Act, and no one is challenging that.
c)

The Court Upholds the FCC's Forward-Looking Formula
Because it Met the "Just and Reasonable" Requirement of
the FCC's Enabling Act

Third, the Court upheld forward-looking rate setting because it
effectively met the "just and reasonable" requirement of the FCC's76
enabling act, while proposing to answer long-standing concerns.
The Court recalls the history of intrastate versus interstate carrier
duties noting that, "[r]egulation of retail rates at the state and local
level was ... focused more on the demand for 'just and reasonable'
rates to the public than on the perils of rate discrimination. 77
Furthermore, amidst the growing pains and various incarnations of
rate formulas such as: fair-value, the prudent investment rule, actual
legitimate cost, and price caps, the Court was keen to point out what
did not change.78 This was "the idea that calculating a rate base and
then allowing a fair rate of return on it was a sensible way to identify
a range of rates that would be just and reasonable to investors and
ratepayers.,, 79 The Court then takes the opportunity to state another
"[e]qually enduring [concern,] dissatisfaction with the successive
rate-based variants."80
From the constancy of this dissatisfaction, one
possible lesson was drawn by Congress in the 1996
Act, which was that regulation using the traditional
rate-based methodologies gave monopolies too great
an advantage and that the answer lay in moving away
from the assumption common to all the rate-based

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 478, 489.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 488.
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methods, that the monopolistic structure within the
8
discrete markets would endure. 1
Undoubtedly, Congress made a big move with the 1996 Act.
They took a gamble with the latitude of the FCC enabling act
language "just and reasonable rates" and set out to create a formula
that made a clean break from the past.82 Congress's determination to
think outside the box went against the grain of over 100 years of
precedent in telecom regulation.8 3 Perhaps most surprising, was the
FCC's acceptance of their charge from the 1996 Act. The FCC had
direct pressure from the very incumbents it had been keeping in
power for so long. The incumbents naturally urged the FCC to
oppose the 1996 Act in the FCC's interpretation and action. The
FCC also had the most to lose in terms of scrutiny and fund depletion
when the lawsuits started rolling in from state commissions,
84
incumbent carriers, and the judiciary itself.
The FCC also could have taken the 1996 Act to court itself, with
potential arguments that the 1996 Act's lack of direction as to the
means which the FCC was to fulfill its order, or that the 1996 Act
was, in essence, an order against the FCC's enabling act, because deregulation could be considered a death knell for the FCC's future.
But the FCC did neither of those things. They accepted the 1996
Act's call for change and delivered the news to their incumbents with
85
a straight face.
d) The Court Upholds the FCC's Forward-Looking Formula
Because the Court Agreed with the Formula's Methodology
Finally, and most importantly, the Court upheld the methodology
behind the forward-looking ratesetting formula.86 Arguments against
this methodology were at the foundation of all five underlying cases
contained in Verizon, and gave the Court reason to join them and

81. Id.
82. Id. at 489.
83. Id.

84. Iowa Utils. Bd., 109 F.3d at 418.
85. Reed Hundt, supra note 1.
86. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 527-28.
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grant certiorari.87 Incumbents in this case attack both the lack of
"past investment" as a factor for determining cost, and the TELRIC
88
formula itself.
i. Incumbents Object to the Methodology of the Ratesetting
Formula Because it Precludes the Use Past Investments
When Calculating "Cost"
The first objection that the Court fields from the incumbents is
not that the 1996 Act, in theory, precludes any forward-looking
methodology, but that "the cost of providing a competitor with a
network element in the future must be calculated using the
incumbent's past investment in the element and the means of
providing it."' 89 The Court swiftly swoops down on this argument
declaring that the incumbents have "picked an uphill battle" because
they are arguing that "cost" in this case, "can only mean, in plain
language and this particular technical context, the past cost to an
incumbent of furnishing the specific network element actually,
physically, to be provided." 90 The Court illustrates the lack of logic
in the incumbents' "plain language" definition of cost through the
example of a merchant who is asked about his cost. The Court says
that this merchant may "reasonably quote . . . current wholesale

market price, not the cost of the particular items he happens to have
on his shelves, which may have been bought at higher or lower
prices.' 91

But it is not illogical to look towards the past when determining
costs of any sort for the present or the future; and the incumbents
were used to determinations based on past results. 92 Furthermore, the
incumbents in this case are not asking that the past be the only factor
in determining future cost, only that it be one factor. At first blush,
the Court may have been overly cautious in excluding past
investment from any part of the final cost equation.

87. See supra, note 62.
88. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 496-97, 500, 523.
89. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Iowa Utilities Bd., 120 F.3d at 793 n.8.
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However, the Court weighed the deliberate nature of Congress's
decision to pass the 1996 Act quite heavily. 93 Congress's intent,
together with the history of monopoly and facts showing a need for
radical change in order to affect actual competition, resulted in the
Court's conclusion that drastic times call for drastic measures; the
Court upheld the FCC formula
forbidding the consideration of
94
costs.
historical or "embedded"
Likewise, in the technical realm, the Court notes the following
three inconsistencies with the incumbent's interpretation of "cost" as
actual past cost: (1) past rate-making did not assume that cost
included all past investments, "but at most for those that were
prudent," (2) even when entire investment was considered,
ratemakers often rejected these "embedded costs," and (3) "cost"
traditionally, "was a term in value-based ratemaking" and has been
used "in contemporary state and federal ratemaking untethered to
historical evaluation. 95 The Court is on its highest ground in the
"technical definition of cost" argument, because the term (which was
explored in the History section, supra section II) has never been
pigeonholed into one particular definition due to the varied and ever96
evolving past of ratemaking.
While it is true that the 1996 Act is "radically unlike all previous
statutes in providing that rates be set 'without reference to a rate-ofreturn or other rate-based proceeding,"' the rates are still tied to "just
and reasonable and nondiscriminatory standards" and allow for a
reasonable profit. 97 When taken in line with the overall changes in
rate determination and Congress's intent to affect a98sweeping change,
the Court's decision on this point is not surprising.
Finally, the Court cites Hope Natural Gas for its assertion that
"regulatory bodies required to set rates expressed in [just and

93. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 489.
94. 11 FCC Rcd 1, § 51.505(b) (1996).
95. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 499 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S.
299, 312 (1989)); Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 597-98; see also, Mobil Oil

Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211,
224-25 (1991)).
96. Id. at 477-88.
97. Id. at 489 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i)).
98. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i)).
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reasonable] terms have ample discretion to choose methodology." 99
In Hope Natural Gas, "[t]he primary issue in [the] cases [the court
reviewed] concern[ed] the validity under the Natural Gas Act of 1938
...of

a rate order issued by the Federal Power Commission reducing

00
the rates chargeable by Hope Natural Gas Co."
The Court found that under the Natural Gas Act, the ratemaking
function of the Federal Power Commission involves making
pragmatic adjustments, and the Commission is not bound to the use
of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining
rates.' 01 Both Hope Natural Gas, and Verizon involve rate orders
from federal regulatory agencies which involve the making of
pragmatic judgments, judgments which are allowed under the 1934
and 1996 Acts.' 0 2 The Court is reaffirming the message that when
Congress gives an agency power to do something that Congress
cannot implement in a practical day-to-day manner, either because
Congress lacks the expertise, the time or both, then the agency has
discretion to make ratemaking decisions that affect change, as long as
they are within the parameters of a just and reasonable and
03
nondiscriminatory decision.'
As a result, the definition of "cost" by the FCC was found to be
satisfactory because in both basic and technical usage, "cost" is a
flexible concept and "nothing in § 252(d)(1) plainly requires
reference to historical investment when pegging rates to forward04
looking 'cost.""

ii.

Incumbents Object to TELRIC,
Methodology Chosen by the FCC

the

Ratemaking

The second objection that the incumbents made regarding the
FCC's forward-looking methodology, was to TELRIC, the particular

99. Id. at 469 (citing Hope NaturalGas, 320 U.S. at 602).
100. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 593.
101. Id. at 602-03 (citing Natural Gas Act of 1938, §§ 4(a), 5(a), 6; 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 717c(a), 717d(a), 717(e)).
102. 47 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
103 Id. at § 252(d)(1) (2000).
104. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 501.
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is the acronym for "total element
methodology chosen. TELRIC
'0 5
long-run incremental cost."'
In Rule 505, the FCC defined the "forward-looking
economic cost of an element [as] the sum of (1) the
total element long-run incremental cost of the element
[TELRIC]; [and] (2) a reasonable allocation of
forward-looking common costs," §51.505(a), common
costs being costs incurred in providing a group of
elements that "cannot be attributed directly to
individual elements," §51.505(c)(1). Most important
of all, the FCC decided that the TELRIC 'should be
measured based on the use of, the most efficient
telecommunications technology currently available
and the lowest cost network configuration, given the
06
existing location of the incumbent['s] wire centers."
The incumbents raised two complaints regarding TELRIC, first
that it was inconsistent "with the plain language of §252(d)(1)," and
second, that it was not "within the zone of reasonable interpretation
subject to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). " 107 The
incumbents base their rationale on the fact that TELRIC references a
"hypothetical, most efficient element at existing wire-centers" and
not the literal network element that is given to the competing
carrier.'

08

1. TELRIC is Inconsistent With the "Plain Language" of
§252(d)(1)
The Court addresses the "plain language" complaint by
referencing the incumbents' former plain language argument. 10 9
Justice Souter dismisses the claim because it presupposes that "plain

105. Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 749.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Verizon, 535 U.S. at 495 (quoting 47 CFR §51.505(a), (b)(1), (c)(1)).
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.

230

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

23-1

language" means that cost must be tied to a past historical
investment, and the Court believes that "'cost' is simply too protean
to support the incumbents' argument.""110
Although the Court treats the incumbents' TELRIC plain
language argument in the exact same manner as the "cost" plain
language argument, the "hypothetical element" questioned by the
incumbents here is actually quite different than the consideration of
cost in general (although both ultimately deal with the bottom
line)."' Being required to price their elements leased to competitors
at a rate that assumes most efficiency is a perfect world approach." 2
It is understandable that the incumbents would reject this mandate,
because they had to pay "old regime" prices for their equipment, and
assuming that their elements depreciate over time, it is no longer as
efficient as it could be. Incumbents get a double penalty because
they are required to maintain and support equipment that is less than
the "most efficient," while pricing it as if it is.'
TELRIC strays
from basic business principles because owners, the incumbents, are
not allowed to pass along the required maintenance and repair costs
14
to their customers who, stingingly, are also their competitors.1
2. TELRIC is Not Reasonable Under Chevron Deference
The Court gives ample consideration of the incumbents' threepart "reasonable interpretation" argument where the incumbents
contend that: (1) Hypothetical elements may simulate, but do not
actually induce competition (In other words, assuming "perfect
competition" results in no competition. (i.e., why build your own
network when you can lease elements?)); (2) TELRIC specifically
does not induce competition because it does not allow for
depreciation or risk-adjusted capital costs; (3) TELRIC is needlessly,
hence unreasonably, complicated and impractical. 115 The Court

110. Id.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 502-03.
Id.
Id. at 504.

Id.
Id. at 504-05.

De.Regulation as the New Regulation

Sp~ring 2003

addresses each contention one by one, ultimately rejecting each
point.
a. Hypothetical Elements Do Not Induce Competition
The Court disagrees with the incumbents' first argument on three
points: First, TELRIC does not assume perfect competition and, in
fact, "includes several features of inefficiency" that do stimulate
competition. 116 For example, ratesetters are to calculate the cost from
elements available at the "existing" center, not elsewhere. 1 7 This
narrows the range of "most efficient" rates to choose from."1 8 Also,
it takes time for competitors to shop around and see what the most
efficient rates are, so there will not be a mass exodus of customers or
forced rate drop every time a new element is introduced." 9
There is something to be said for the Court taking such a realistic
approach. It is hard to argue with its assertion that no matter how
competitively "perfect" the assumptions of TELRIC are on paper,
inefficiencies in implementation are always the great equalizer.
Furthermore, the limitation of the "existing center" in determining
"most efficient" elements is no small matter. This effectively ties the
competitors to the incumbent market they are seeking to0 enter and
allows no unfair advantage in terms of national leverage.12
In fact, it could be argued that this limitation goes as far as
introducing the "historical" cost effect on the competing entrants,
because if they are tied to an existing center's most efficient rate, the
incumbents are already quite aware of the rate range and have
adjusted cost accordingly. This would undoubtedly show up in the
range of rates available to the competing entrants.
Secondly, comparisons of TELRIC with the alternatives
presented by the incumbents, shows that the FCC had good reasons
for rejecting the alternatives and choosing TELRIC.' 2 ' The Court
considered three alternative methods offered by the incumbents:

116. Id. at
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at
120. Id. at
121. Id. at

504.

504-05.
505.
504.
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"embedded-cost methodologies, efficient component pricing
rule,
and Ramsey pricing."' 122 The Court found that each alternative raised
the basic complaint that TELRIC encouraged short-term efficiency
and discouraged a long-term cycle of building, growing, innovating,
and competing.
The Court opposed these alternatives for two reasons.123 First, if
lease rates "compensated" the incumbents for their inefficiencies, the
rates would go up and it would keep potential competitors out of the
market. 24 Second, innovation works both ways. The incumbents
were claiming that TELRIC would keep competitors from building
because they would just latch onto the next, lowest rate and not
build. 125 But the Court said that incumbents could do the very same
thing as soon as an incumbent came out with a new, more efficient
26
technology, essentially it is a wash. 1
While the Court's decision is certainly logical for the purposes of
honoring the 1996 Act's intent to increase in competition, the
incumbents' argument that long-term stability is being sacrificed for
short-term stimulation of competition is valid. There was a reason
that the "natural monopoly" of telecom was protected for as long as it
was: utilities cannot afford to be unstable because of the vast public
reliance on their services.
The danger in the Court's general characterization of theses
alternatives in favor of competition at all costs, is that the telecom
market will get a bunch of "fly-by-night" entrants who collapse
leaving their customers with unreliable means of communication. 127
This could wreak havoc on the state of business and our economy as
a whole, and put those that last into the unenviable position of having
to rebuild the industry for the second time and with stripped
resources. Third and finally, the Court found the results of the FCC's
First Order and Report spoke for themselves. 28 From the passage of
the 1996 Act through 2000, $55 billion dollars have been invested in

122. Id. at 508.

123. Id. at 508-513.
124. Id. at 509-10.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 509-13.
127. Id. at 510, n.27.
128 Id. at 516.
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competing markets.' 2 9 The FCC breaks down the new competitors
into the following categories: "33 percent of entrants were using their
own facilities; 23 percent were reselling services; and 44 percent
no further
were leasing network elements."' 3 ° The Court needed
3'
competition.'
induces
TELRIC
that
finding
persuasion,
It is pretty hard to argue with the facts, especially when 33
percent of the entrants are building from the ground up when it would
be much easier for them to lease. These facts indicate that TELRIC
is not an open call for a gold rush, but an open door for serious
competitors who anticipate staying in the industry once allowed in.
b. Competition is not Induced Because it Does Not
Allow for Depreciation or Risk-Adjusted Capital
Costs
Addressing the second part of the incumbents' three-part
"reasonable interpretation" argument, the Court once again found
that the FCC had not erred in their adoption of TELRIC. 132 The
incumbents argue that TELRIC does not allow for enough tax
incentives to induce "rational competition" because "the incumbents
will be stuck . . . with sunk costs in less efficient plant[s] and
equipment, with their investment unrecoverable through depreciation,
33
and their increased risk [is] unrecognized and uncompensated." 1
The Court argues that the incumbent's argument rests on a
"fundamentally false premise," because the FCC has given state
commissions the responsibility for these matters in paragraph 702 of
the First Report and Order. 134 The Court contends that TELRIC does
not fix percentage rates or delineate a particular useful life for
purposes of calculating depreciation, because "TELRIC rates are
calculated on the basis of individual elements. TELRIC rates leave
plenty of room for differences in the appropriate depreciation rates

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 516-17 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 504-05, 515-18.
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 517-20 (citing FCC, First Report and Order

702).
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and risk-adjusted capital costs depending on the nature and
35
technology of the specific element to be priced."'
This argument by the incumbents seems almost comical because
"increased risk" is never a guarantee of a positive tax outcome. It
simply results in loss or gain and is categorized and dealt with
accordingly. What the incumbents seem to complain about here is
that they somehow want a tax break if they are forced to comply with
the FCC's rules regarding the 1996 Act. We all would like a tax
break for doing what we are told, but sadly, there are only penalties
for non-compliance when you are dealing with the U.S. government.
The incumbents are understandably reluctant to follow the new
regime. But while it may be true that TELRIC does not allow for the
depreciation to be passed along to the competing entrants, nowhere in
the FCC's order does it instruct the final elements of taxation.
c. TELRIC is Needlessly, and Hence Unreasonably,
Complicated and Impractical
Finally, the Court speaks to the third and last part of the
incumbents' "reasonable interpretation" argument, by simply finding
that the alternatives are just as complex. The Court follows this up
with a nod to the ease of the TELRIC calculation, and concludes that
while "battles of experts" are unavoidable, the FCC was wise to
choose the approach that did not preserve the "home-field advantages
1 36
for the incumbents."
The "home-field advantage" is the key to the Court's reasoning.
While Justice Souter patiently and dutifully addresses each of the
incumbents' arguments, there is an overall sense that the Court might
as well tell the incumbents that whatever arguments they might have
cannot prevail because the Court is interpreting the purpose of this
Act as one that takes away incumbent advantage in order to get new
37
players and put them on an equal playing field. 1
Therefore, the Court's finding that TELRIC is consistent with the
plain language of the 1996 Act 252(d)(1) and within the reasonable
interpretation subject to deference under Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v.

135. Id. at 521.
136. Id. at 521.
137. Id. at 521-23.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, was due to
the fact that the incumbents failed to show unreasonableness.13 8 The
incumbents failed, in great part because they "mischaracterize[d] the
FCC's departures from the assumption of a perfectly competitive
market . . . as inconsistencies rather than pragmatic features of the
139
TELRIC plan."
In a last stab at the FCC's methodology, the incumbents argue
that TELRIC is unconstitutional because: (1) the ratemaking
methodology is "so divorced from investment actually made," that it
constitutes a taking under the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment; and
(2) the incumbent's reliance interests are "jeopardized by an
intentional switch in ratesetting methodologies." 140
The first argument is unusual because the incumbents are not
arguing that a particular rate itself is the problem, which is the
normal rule for this type of argument. 14 1 The Court says that the lack
of a specific rate to review is of special note because "this Court has
never considered a taking challenge on a ratesetting methodology
without first being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be
confiscatory."' 142 The incumbents argue that their claim should be
considered a special case because there are "signs, too strong to
ignore" that TELRIC will result in takings. The Court dismisses this
assertion because, with no number to review, the Court would be
making a constitutional decision on a ratemaking issue "sight
43
unseen." 1
The second argument by upset incumbent reliance interests is
similarly dismissed by the Court because they claim there was no
"'switch' of methodologies, since the wholesale market for leasing
network elements is something brand new under the 1996 Act" and
that it was not made in the interests of being opportunistic, but for the
very opposite reason.' 44

138. Id.

139. Id. at 523.
140. Id. at 526.
141. Id. See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 302, 303-04 (1989).
142. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 471-72.
143. Id. at 525-26.
144. Id. at 528.
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While theoretically, a methodology is separate from its result, and
theoretically should be able to be analyzed apart from a real-life rate
number, the Court decides not to indulge that type of analysis in this
case. 145 It is a decision that is practical and understandably in the
interests of efficiency, relevancy, and accuracy. There will be many
years to deal with the real-life rate conflicts resulting from the
decisions in this case. There is no need to seek out invisible ratemonsters hiding under the bed of this young statute.
The impact of judicial review of the rate methodology issues in
this case, as opposed to executive or legislative review, which will be
expressed when the public experiences the effects of the 1996 Act in
their day-to-day lives, is also significant. Because the judiciary can
only rule on what is before it, the Court has no power to take case
law precedent and combine it with aspects of the 1996 Act to
"smooth out the edges." This must have been a tough limitation to
recognize in the wake of so much litigation passed, and no end in
sight.
2. The FCC is Authorized to "Require Incumbents to Combine Such
Elements at the Entrant's Request When they Lease Them to the
Entrants."
The second main argument is brought by the Government and the
competing carriers. They would like the Court to "overturn the
Eighth Circuit's invalidation of the additional combination rules"
found in the 1996 Act's sections 51.315(c)-(f). 146 The incumbents
counter by saying that the "challenge is barred by waiver," because
the initial petition for review to the Eighth Circuit in 1999 only
considered
315(b) and not (c)-(f). However, briefing was invited on
14 7
(C)(f).

Despite this, the incumbents say that the Eighth Circuit exceeded
their scope and as a result the Supreme Court should "decline to
reach the validity of Rules 315(c)-(f)" because it encourages

145. Id.
146. Id. at 528-29 (citing 47 U.S.C. 51.315(c)-(f)).
147. Id.
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"piecemeal litigation."''

48

The government strikes the incumbent's
argument down on two grounds: first, the Court did not believe that
addressing this issue was wasteful, but would direct the Court's
attention to "the invalidation of FCC rules meant to have general and
continuing applicability."' 4 9 This was not a case where no appeal
had been made because of "litigation tactics." 150 Secondly, the Court
cites United States v. Williams as standing for the fact that "[any
issue 'pressed or passed upon below' by a federal court ... is subject
1 51
to this Court's broad discretion."
It seems an odd tactic of advocacy for the incumbents, who have
taken such blows already, to raise an objection that intimates any
limitation on the Court's power. The incumbent's argument seems to
dare the Court to go where, clearly, the Eighth Circuit was not afraid
to go when it opened the topic of these additional rules. The history
of these rules in the earlier cases is non-dramatic, as the Court points
out, so the incumbents' whole approach comes across as "stirring-up
trouble."
The Court proceeds to attack the Eighth Circuit's finding that the
"four additional combination rules" were at odds with the 1996
Act. 152 The Court begins with its rationale for why the rules were put
into place and why they are necessary, stating that before their
implementation, incumbents "were refusing to give competitor's
technicians access" to the incumbent's physical plants to make the
connections between the competitor's new line and the incumbent's
53
main hub. 1
The Court considers the first two substantive rules, 315(c), and
(d).
315(e), and (f) are procedural and had no independent
54
significance to the Court. 1

148. Id. at 529 (citing Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1961)).
149. Id. at 530.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992)).
152. Id. at 532.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 532-33.

238

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

23-1

Rule 315(c) requires an incumbent to 'perform the
functions necessary to combine unbundled network
elements in any manner, even if those elements are not
ordinary combined' in the incumbent's own network,
so long as the combination is '[t]echnically feasible'
and '[w]ould not impair the ability of other carriers to
obtain access to unbundled network elements or to
with incumbent's network. The
interconnect'
companion Rule 315(d) likewise requires the
incumbent to do the combining between the network
own
elements it leases and a requesting carrier's
55
elements, so long as technically feasible.'
The incumbents argue that the rules are not valid because they are
inconsistent with plain language, and are unreasonable interpretations
of the 1996 Act §251(c). 156 The language in question is §251(c)(3),
"[a]n incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled
network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications
57
service."1
While the Eighth Circuit held this language to mean that
incumbents were excused from any duty of combining for entrants,
the Court on review, interprets it differently stating, "[i]f Congress
had treated incumbent and entrants as equals" the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation would have made sense. 158 But since the 1996 Act
"proceeds on the understanding that incumbent monopolists and
contending competitors are unequal ...

it takes a stretch to get from

right on the part of the
permissive statutory silence to a ' statutory
59
combine."'
to
refuse
to
incumbents
Weighing this rationale along side of the practical interpretations
of the surrounding statutes, as well as the Chevron rule, (which gives
deference to the federal agency unless its interpretation is found to be
482 (1999) and quoting Rule
155. Id. (citing 15 FCC Rcd 3696, 3910
315(c)).
156. Id.
157. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
158. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 533 (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 759).
159. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 533. Cf 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000) ("Additional
obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers.").
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unreasonable) resulted in the Court's finding that "[a]n obligation on
the part of an incumbent ...only arises when the entrant is unable to
do the job itself. When an incumbent does have an obligation, the
rules specify a duty to 'perform the functions necessary
to combine,'
'1 60
combination."
actual
the
complete
to
not necessarily
The Court concludes this holding by rationalizing that the
incumbent, rather than the entrant is in the best position to efficiently
connect the elements and they are entitled to a reasonable fee for
their services; therefore, the connection is really just another way to
make money from the entrants.' 61
Certainly this aspect of the case is the greatest issue where
reasonable minds may differ. Both sides concede that there is a gray
area in the language of the 1996 Act, but find different ways of
"wordsmithing" their way into its meaning.' 62 The Court, as with
other issues in the case, weighed the overall intent 63
of pro-competition
heavily, landing firmly on the side of the entrants.
While the incumbents are in the most advantageous position to
combine elements with the least amount of effort (they own the
system, built the system and still control who comes in and out
through contracting) it is only logical that they connect the elements
if their new "lessee" cannot. However, seems to coddle the entrants
almost too much. If the entrants are supposedly competing on an
equal playing field, and there is to be nondiscriminatory treatment,
they need to be ready to handle the responsibilities of playing in the
telecom sandbox. They should be able to bring their own shovels.

160. Id. at 535 (citing First Report and Order

294; 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.315(c)-

(d)).
161. Id. at 536.
Thus, the incumbents are wrong to claim that the restriction to "technical
feasibility" places only minimal limits on the duty to combine, since the
First Report and Order makes it clear that what is 'technically feasible'
does not mean merely what is 'economically reasonable,' or what is
simply practical or possible in an engineering sense.
(See First Report and Order
196-199).
162. Id.; Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 757-58.
163. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 534-35.
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ConcurringOpinion and Analysis of the Dissent

Justice Breyer agrees that the 1996 Act does not require costs and
rates to be determined by historical investment, and that the FCC
rules do not constitute a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.164 Justice Breyer disagrees, however, with "the
Court's conclusion that the specific pricing and unbundling rules at
165
issue here are authorized by the [1996] Act.
Justice Breyer first attacks the hypothetical nature of the
determination of rates under the FCC rules. 166 Through an example
in which a five-block stretch of downtown Chicago is named the
"network element," Justice Breyer contrasts the costs of what an
actual incumbent would have to pay to give it service versus the
TELRIC hypothetical in which a new supplier with the most efficient
technology builds the network form scratch. 167 Justice Breyer states
that this system exceeds even the wide discretion that agencies have
in ratemaking due to their expertise. 68 Justice Breyer fails to see the
required "rational connection" between the statutory purpose of the
1996 Act to promote competition, and the egregious difference
between a hypothetical and perfectly efficient formula and the actual
169
cost to the incumbent facilitating the connection.
Justice Breyer makes a good point, especially in light of the fact
that the Court has held that results of a ratemaking strategy are what
count, and not the strategy itself. 70 How are we to resolve the bias
towards the entrants? The Majority said we are not to resolve it. The
Majority asserts that it is Congress's intent to turn things upside "
17
down. 1
Yet, there is something that seems unfair about holding the
incumbent's advantage against them. We, as Americans, have been

164. Id. at 538-39.
165. Id. at 539.
166. Id. at 540-42.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971); Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602).
169. Id. at 542-44.
170. Id. at 503-15. Emphasis added.
171. Id. at 490-91.
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raised with the ideals of "first in time, first in right" and that we
should be rewarded for our hard-won place in society and the
economy-not penalized for it. Taking the big hand of Congress and
sweeping it across the table of the telecom industry in an effort to "do
over" frustrates 100 years of hard-earned history.
In Part II of his opinion, Justice Breyer admonishes that "The
Telecommunications Act is not a ratemaking statute seeking better
regulation. It is a deregulatory statute seeking competition."' 72 To
this end, Justice Breyer believes that the 1996 Act does not allow
FCC regulations that would hinder the transition of the telecom
industry from a regulated industry to a non-regulated industry, which
73
he believes the TELRIC rates will do. 1
Justice Breyer aptly supports his view with five elements
including the 1996 Act's express goal to "promote competition and
reduce regulation," concluding that the 1996 Act "seeks new local
market competition insofar as local markets can support that
competition without serious waste."' 174 "And we must read the
relevant rate setting provision-including the critical word 'cost'175
with that goal in mind."'
This portion of Breyer's opinion may be too severe. The
incumbents do not argue that the FCC order is an attempt to thwart
competition. 176 What Justice Breyer seems to be saying is that the
FCC is getting in the way of its own goal through its choice of
77
TELRIC as the preferred method of ratemaking. 1
While TELRIC may be controversial, this criticism goes too far
because it assumes that the FCC's intent is to gain tighter control
under the guise of promoting competition. However, the FCC did
not draft a whole Special Edition tome of the FCC Record for the fun
of it; Congress mandated that the FCC play an integral part in the
78
implementation and enforcement of the 1996 Act.1

172. Id. at 543.
173. Id. at 544.
174. Id. at 544-47.
175. Id. at 548.
176. Id. at 467-68.
177. Id. at 544-47.
178. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) ("[T]here is created a commission to be known as
the 'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall be constituted as
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In Part III of his opinion, Justice Breyer asserts that TELRIC will
promote wasteful behavior by incumbents and entrants because there
will be uneconomical sharing of the incumbent's facilities because
' 179
the entrants will lease instead of "building or buying elsewhere."
Justice Breyer says that this sharing is counter-competition and will
increase the need for regulation rather than curtail it. 180 In addition,
Justice Breyer finds the TELRIC method speculative to a degree
which necessitates a "battle of the experts," and can find no offsetting
advantages for these faults.'81
In theory, Justice Breyer's concern is quite valid.
What
competitor would actually want to build a new network when the
incumbents' networks are ready to lease? But the reality of entrant
activity (discussed infra Section IV, in the Impact section) answers
this question with the solid figure of 33 percent. 82 The reasons to
build can be just as convincing: the use of the newest technology,
control of your own lines and a bottom to top network that doesn't
change hands along the way. Time, ultimately will tell if Justice
Breyer's concerns come back to haunt the telecom industry.
Part IV contains six responses that the FCC gave in response to
Justice Breyer's concerns in Part III supra.183 Justice Breyer
ultimately finds that they are not satisfactory in showing the required
rational relationship between the 1996 Act and the FCC
regulations. 184 Justice Breyer addresses each of the six in order,
asserting that:

hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
chapter.").
179. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 549.
180. Id. at 548-53.
181. Id. at 554-55.
182. Id. at 516-17 (citing M. Glover & D. Epps, Is the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 Working?, 52 ADMIN. L.REv. 1013, 1015 (2000)). ($30 billion invested

through 1999). The FCC's statistics indicate substantial resort to pure and partial
facilities-based competition among the three entry strategies: as of June 30, 2001,
33 percent of entrants were using their own facilities; 23 percent were reselling
services; and 44 percent were leasing network elements (26 percent of entrants
leasing loops with switching; 18 percent without switching). See FCC, Local
Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001, at 2. T.3-4 (Feb. 27, 2002).

183. Id. at 554-61.
184. Id. at 554.
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1. The FCC claims to allow for a depreciation charge
for a reasonable investment in equipment, while
"require[ing] state commissions to use current
depreciation rates" (not historic).
Additionally, there
1 85
invest.'
to
incentives
no
are
2. Permissible profit rates are not flexible enough
(despite the FCC's assurances that the state
commission can adjust them). Justice Breyer believes
that the "tentative guidance" the rules offer are clearly
a product of the time crunch the FCC was in to
complete the order, and they optimistically assume
"that current market conditions mean that current
profit rates somehow magically offset the adverse
' 86
effects of the Commission's other regulations."'
3. The FCC claims that TELRIC has been used by
several States and European nations but there is no
evidence that this is the case. The TELRIC formula
"reflect[s] Congress's desire to obtain not perfect
87
prices but speedy results."'
4. Hypothetically, the most efficient element promotes
sharing instead of independent building. Also, the
"hypothetical" methodology is consistent with
88
ratemaking for regulation and not deregulation.'
5. The FCC says TELRIC leaves freedom of
interpretation for the States, yet they have national
89
standards and guidelines.1
6. The Majority's assertion that "lag time" keep the
hypothetical most efficient element in check and

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 554-56.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 560.
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based in reality, doesn't fix the underlying problem of
its disparate effects.' 9 0
Taken together, these claims call out the imperfections and
controversies of the FCC Rules. The choice of the methodology does
19
not have history on its side, nor is it firmly based in reality. '
TELRIC is a formula, like many others used in the past as a means to
an end. When the effects of its parameters (or lack thereof) come to
light, Congress will be called on to answer for them. The Majority
has decided to trust Congress. It is easy to see why this would be
unsettling to Justice Breyer. Where is the precedent? Where is the
reasonableness in venturing into the great unknown? Justice Breyer
appears to cry out as the last guard at the post as his colleagues all
jump off the cliff. But TELRIC, in the end, is probably a small curb
of a drop rather than the cliff the incumbents would make it out to be.
The FCC has too much accountability to telecom businesses to hang
its old nearest and dearest completely out to dry.
In Part V, Justice Breyer continues his claim that the FCC Rules
will result in more regulation in their operation, and the Statute's
aims were de-regulation. 192 Justice Breyer claims that the Majority
has been overcome by the deference to the technical expertise of the
FCC. 193 He intonates that they may not have "dug-in" substantively
enough, although he doesn't insinuate that the Majority neglected
1 94
thorough review.'
It is an easy criticism to say that a regulatory agency would want
more regulation, but the FCC did not take it upon themselves to issue
the First Report and Order.' 95 Nor did the FCC come up with the
rules out of thin air. 19 6 According to Reed Hunt, Chairman of the
FCC, the First Report and Order rules were based on four elements of
pro-competition approach, which included the 1996 Act and its
harmony with them:

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 500, 553-59.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 175.
Reed Hundt, supra note 1.
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1. Do not favor any particular mode of competitive
entry (such as facilities construction, leasing
unbundled elements or resale), but allow entrants to
select the methods of entry that best fit their business
plans;
2. Entrants must not be charged more than economic
cost, and incumbents must be allowed to charge
economic cost, for leasing parts of the incumbent
network or for terminating calls on the network for
leasing those elements and termination.
3. Wholesale prices for resold local service must be
priced at retail less avoided costs that can or should be
avoided; and
4. The job of creating and sustaining subsidies must
be separated from the prices for leasing parts of the
terminating
incumbent monopolist's network, or for
97
1
network.
local
incumbent's
the
on
calls
While the FCC does have the upper hand in technical expertise,
the Majority "dug-in" enough to know that the Rules were submitted
in good-faith with. Their opinion cites and evaluates several
coming to the conclusion that
competing theories, ultimately
1 98
TELRIC passes the test.
99
Finally, in Part VI, Justice Breyer is joined by Justice Scalia.1
Both contend that the Majority's holding - that incumbents are
required to combine network elements for the entrants when they are
20 0
unable to do so - is in opposition to the language of the 1996 Act.
They join the incumbents in questioning, "How

. .

. can a statute that

speaks of the requesting carrierscombining elements, grant the FCC

197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. at 500-01.
Id. at 563.
Id.
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the

Perhaps the real question is how many times each party can stand
on their own side of a statutory gray area and declare violation of
their interpretation of that statute! Discussion of the Majority's
decision to require incumbents to combine elements was discussed
earlier, but Justice Breyer scores a practical point in his expectation
that entrants come prepared to play in the big leagues now that they
20 2
are able.
IV. IMPACT

The Verizon decision, while significant, simply solidified FCC
rules and facilitated the tide toward competition that began with the
1996 Act.20 3 Therefore, analyzing the impact of Verizon a mere eight
months post-verdict is, at this stage of the game, one piece of an
overall evaluation of the increase in telecom competition as a whole.
As time goes by, the finer details of the Court's decision will make
themselves apparent, but the following highlights of telecom's six
year journey towards competition illustrates where the issue stands to
date.
A. FirstLook: January, 1998
The first formal review of the "State of Local Competition" was
held before the FCC January 29, 1998.204 The panel included: the

201. Id.
202. Id. at 559-63.
203. FCC Chairman Michael Powell, Statement regarding U.S. Supreme Court

decision of Verizon v. F.C.C, 535 U.S. 478 (2002), May 13, 2002, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2002.html.
I'm pleased that the Supreme Court has affirmed the Commission's
implementation of the 1996 Telecom Act. This decision brings muchneeded additional certainty to the legal landscape and should advance the
Commission's efforts to carry out the statute's competition goals. I thank
the Solicitor General for his vigorous efforts in representing the
Commission before the Court.
204. FCC Hearing, In Re: En Banc on State of Local Competition, Jan. 29,
1998, available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/enbanc/012998/tr0l2998.txt.
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U.S. Telephone Association, ALTS (local service carrier trade
association), the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Each
Commissioners, and a sampling of new carriers.20 5
representative had a unique perspective of the status of competition
in the local telecom carrier market, but the general findings were that:
there were over 100 competing carriers which were making yearly
revenues of 2.7 billion dollars, which was six times the amount they
had made pre-1996 Act in half the time.20 6 However, the incumbent
carriers had yearly revenues of 101 billion dollars, despite the fact
that they are spending an average of 2 billion dollars each to open up
the markets to competitors. 20 7 These numbers show that competing
carriers still had a long way to go to reach "effective competition,"
which the 1996 Act defines as serving fifteen percent of potential
subscribers.20 8
B. Three Year Review: 1996 - 1999

Climbing to nearly five percent of all local exchange carriers, the
competitors increased their marketshare by the end of 1999.209 As
the competitors continued to attract capital, their "5-year returns beat
the S&P 500. ' ' 210 Rising strength in the competitive market was also
indicated by the competitor's increased political contributions.2 1 '
C. Three Year Review: 2000 - 2002

On December 9, 2002, the FCC issued a local telephone
competition report, which compared marketshares of incumbent and
competing carriers from December 1999 through June 2002.21 2 The
205. Id. Representing each organization in order: Roy Neel, Heather Gold,
Lynn Butler and Mike Mahoney for RCN Corporation.
206. Id. Heather Gold, President of ALTS.
207. Id. Heather Gold, President of ALTS; Roy Neel, President of the U.S.
Telephone Association.
208. Thomas W. Hazlett, supra note 9.
209. Id. at 1394.
210. Id.

211. Id.
212. FCC News Release, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data
available at
2002,
9,
Competition, Dec.
Telephone
Local
On
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data was compiled from the mandatory FCC Form 477, which all
2 13
carriers must fill out and return to the FCC.
The findings showed that of the approximately 191 million
switched access lines nationwide, competitive local carriers (CLECs)
have consistently taken more of the total market share:
December 1999:
CLEC Lines = 8 million
CLEC Share = 4.3%
June 2000:
CLEC Lines = 11.5 million
CLEC Share = 6.0%
December 2000:
CLEC Lines = 14.9 million
CLEC Share = 7.7%
June 2001:
CLEC Lines = 17.3 million
CLEC Share = 9.0%

December 2001:
CLEC Lines = 19.6 million
CLEC Share = 10.3%
June 2002:
CLEC Lines = 21.6 million
CLEC Share = 11.4%214

http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCCStateLink/IAD/IcomO7O2.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Id. T.1; n.1

Qualifying carriers reported data as of June 30, 2002 in FCC Form 477
filings due on September 1, 2002. Qualification status is determined
separately for each state. If a carrier, or its holding company, has a least
10,000 local telephone lines in service in a state, it must file local
telephone date for that state. See Local Competition and Broadband
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V. CONCLUSION

The numbers paint a picture of regulatory success. While it is
true that the percentage of actual growth has slowed from 1.7 percent
in December 1999 and June 2000, to 1.3 percent for June and
December 2001, to 1.1 percent in June 2002, there can be no denying
that the growth itself is continuing despite the stock market "bubble
burst" in 2000, the post-September 11, 2001 jitters, the corporate
greed of WorldCom and other non-telecom companies, and the
into a market held down
challenges of competing companies entering
215
incumbents.
large
by
years
100
for over
So far the FCC has carved a new niche for itself as the "enforcer"
216
of deregulation: guarding the seeds of promising new competitors.
Reporting, CC Docket No. 99-301, Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 7717
Readers interested in the specific questions and reporting
(2000) ....
instructions for this data collection can download FCC Form 477, and
associated Instructions, from www.fcc.gov/formpage.html. Id.
215. Id.; FCC News Release, Chairman Powell's Testimony to Senate
Commerce Committee: "Six Critical Steps for Telecom Industry Recovery", July
FCC
available at http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2000.html.;
30,
2002,
Through
Breaking
Model:
Enforcement
The
Tristani,
Gloria
Commissioner
Barriers On The Road to Competition, PLI Annual Institute on
at
available
2000,
14,
Dec.
Telecommunications,
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2000.html.
The Washington Post reported last week that the Stock of twenty-seven of
the thirty-five publicly traded CLECs is priced below $10.00 a share.
Covad recently announced that it is limiting its provision of residential
DSL service to line sharing. Last month ICG Communications filed for
bankruptcy. Some analysts are predicting 50 percent or more of the
CLECs won't survive.
FCC News Release, FCC Assures WorldCom Customers Concerning Continuation
at
available
2002,
26,
July
Service,
Phone
of
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2002.html.
216. Id. The first of our enforcement tools, found in section 208 of the Act,
gives the FCC broad authority to conduct investigations into potential violations of
the Act and our rules. Just over a year ago, we created a new Enforcement Bureau
that consolidated most enforcement matters in one operation. This action reflected
a recognition that we needed a stronger enforcement arm to ensure all parties play
by the rules.
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But to ensure the future of this competition, it is important that the
FCC hold a firm ground and resist catering to the incumbents in an
effort to ease their workload. 2 7 There is always the temptation to
think the battle has been won, but until the competitors are operating
at levels of marketshare that free the public from outrageous phone
bills, there is still work to be done.

FCC News Release, FCC Chairman Powell Recommends Increased FCC
Enforcement Powersfor Local Telephone Competition, May 7, 2001, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2001.html.
FCC Chairman Michael Powell has recommended that Congress increase
the forfeiture level imposed on common carriers violating local
competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 from the
current statutory limit of $1.2 million per violation to at least $10 million
per violation. Powell said, 'In my discussions with competitive local
exchange carriers, they cite enforcement as the key area for increased
regulatory effort.'
217. James K. Glassman, Telecom Waffling at the FCC Helm, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES , Nov 26, 2002,
1,3, availableat http://www.clec.com.
Fair or not, the buzz around Washington on Michael Powell [Colin
Powell's 38-year-old son] is that he's indecisive - overwhelmed by the
complexity of his job as chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission. Perhaps stung by that widespread criticism, he's on the
verge of rushing into a disastrous decision that could cost consumers
billions of dollars, turn back the clock on telecom innovation and damage
the political prospects of the Bush Administration . . . [Hilaving failed to
convince elected officials to gut the law that seeks to deregulate their
business - the Telecommunications Act of 1996 - the Bells have turned
to Mr. Powell, who may be figuring that he can repair his reputation by
giving them what they want.

